We consider the impact of tax policy uncertainty on firm level and aggregate investment, comparing investment behavior when uncertainty is due to a shock following Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) versus when random discrete jumps in tax policy occur. Expectations of the likelihood of a tax policy switch have an important negative impact on the gain to delaying investment in the latter model and time to investment can fall with increasing tax policy uncertainty. Aggregate investment simulations indicate that capital formation is adversely affected by increases in uncertainty in the traditional GBM model but can be enhanced in the jump process model. We also find that mean preserving spreads are attractive to firms when they have discretion over real behavior. In both models, a mean preserving spread lowers the cost of capital conditional on investment as firms shift investment from high to low cost periods. Ex ante mean preserving spreads in general lead to ex post decreases in the price of capital. We relate this finding to the more general literature on mean preserving spreads.
I. Introduction
It is often said that nothing is certain in life except death and taxes . While death is 1 undoubtedly certain, there is, in fact, considerable uncertainty with respect to taxes. Tax policy provides a key source of uncertainty about the cost of capital to U.S. firms, for example. The investment tax credit was first introduced in the United States in 1962, and subsequently, has been changed on numerous occasions. In the United Kingdom, major changes in tax policy have changed the cost of capital and returns to capital investment. For example, in a brief span of 7 years, the U.K. shifted from a two-tiered corporate tax system in which retained earnings were taxed at a higher level than distributed earnings to a classical corporate income tax of the type found in the United States and then to an integrated system .
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A common view is that policy uncertainty discourages investment. This view is not consistent with the predictions of most investment models, which generally indicate that uncertainty increases investment (e.g. Hartman (1972) , Abel (1985) ). The view that tax uncertainty harms investment depends importantly on the irreversibility assumption, and the findings that randomness in output prices retards investment (Pindyck (1988) ) in such models. This paper extends the literature by considering uncertainty in tax policy. In particular, we consider changes in tax policy for investment tax credits (ITCs).
Uncertainty has typically been introduced in previous work by assuming that some parameter follows a continuous time random walk (Brownian Motion or Geometric Brownian Motion). When prices follow a random walk, one's rational-expectations forecast for the price at any time in the future is today's price (perhaps adjusted for drift in the process), and the future path of the price is unbounded. Tax parameters, unlike most prices, tend to remain constant for a few years, and then change abruptly to new values. In addition, the jump that occurs is likely to be mean-reverting: When tax credits are high, they are likely to be reduced in the future; when they are low, they are likely to be increased. Finally they range between zero and one. More succinctly, the former process is non-stationary while the latter is stationary.
Given the latter jump process, there is the possibility that the firm might invest today, only to see an ITC introduced, or might delay investment today, only to see an existing ITC repealed.
Armed with the knowledge of the expected frequency with which tax policy changes as well as the support of the distribution of tax parameters, firms will delay or speed up investment depending on their perceptions of the probability and magnitude of tax changes. Below, we show that this behavior is crucial to understanding the effects of uncertain tax policy. An analogy may be useful here. One concern with tax-preferred savings vehicles is that they simply shift savings from non-tax-preferred accounts to tax-preferred accounts with no change in aggregate savings.
Random tax credit policy raises the same issue: is aggregate investment altered by changes in the frequency or level of credits, or is simply the timing of investment changed as firms shift investment from low to high tax credit periods? In addition, we consider the impact of fluctuating tax policy for government revenue.
These observations on actual tax policy behavior suggest that a Poisson jump process may generate useful insights on the impact of tax policy uncertainty. One set of parameters of a Poisson jump process give the expected duration of a tax policy state but not the actual duration. Jack and Viard (1996) have considered an investment model with temporary tax 3 incentives. But there is no uncertainty over future tax policy in their model.
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Data over the past 30 years for U.S. corporations can help pin down those parameters. For example, Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994) provide a review of post-war U.S. tax changes.
Since 1962, the mean duration of a typical state in which a specific ITC is in effect is 3.67 years.
The mean duration of the "no-ITC" state is 3.00 years. We will use these average durations later to provide benchmark values of the Poisson jump process parameters. The second set of parameters provide information about the magnitude of the jump among states. Our focus in this paper is on changes in this second set of parameters.
To date, there has been little work addressing the issue of investment behavior and tax policy uncertainty . That tax policy is uncertain is not a new concept; indeed, the notion that 3 investment tax credits may randomly switch on and off was a key argument in Lucas (1976) .
More recently, Auerbach and Hines (1988) attack this same problem in a discrete-time model in which there is a probability each year that tax policy (an investment tax credit or depreciation allowances) will change. They obtain a tractable solution by making linear approximations around steady-state values of the capital stock. This turns out to be a critical simplification as the use of a first order approximation around the steady state means that the information in the second moment of the distribution of tax policies is eliminated. Thus mean preserving spreads of the distribution of the random tax variable will have no effect on the measures of effective tax rates that they construct. Bizer and Judd (1989) develop and solve numerically a general equilibrium model that includes random taxation. In this closed-economy model, investment equals saving, and saving Focusing on mean preserving spreads follows in the tradition of the investment 4 uncertainty literature (e.g. Hartman (1972) , Abel (1985) and others).
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follows from utility maximization. Thus the results they derive, that fluctuations in output attributable to random taxation lower welfare, are intrinsically related to the curvature of the utility function. In this paper, we follow Pindyck (1988) and Abel (1983) and focus on the investment decision of producers. As a result we are unable to draw the sorts of welfare conclusions that Bizer and Judd do, but we can specify investment behavior more precisely building on an extensive literature on investment behavior.
To be specific, we consider random policy toward an investment tax credit for new capital and investigate the impact on investment of a mean preserving spread. We consider the 4 following question: if a country passed a constitutional (and irrevocable) ban on changes in the investment tax credit, would investment go up or down? An alternative question is whether government can manipulate uncertainty in some revenue neutral way to increase investment (in effect benefitting from a policy free-lunch)? We argue below that such a policy free-lunch is not available and that increases in uncertainty of a mean preserving type will inevitably result in lost tax revenue for the government. In effect, a subsidy will be provided to investment. This follows because firms always have the option to decide when to invest. Increasing variation in investment costs brings with it the opportunity to wait out high cost periods and invest in low cost periods. This is the first key finding in our paper. While we develop the argument in the context of tax policy, we argue that the result is more general.
In addition, we find that the impact of tax policy uncertainty on investment depends importantly on whether the stochastic process is mean stationary or not. Using a model of tax dp t ' µ p p t dt % F p p t dz p Decreasing returns to scale is a necessary but not sufficient condition on the 5 production function. Second order conditions will place the additional restriction on the production function that the ratio of the average to marginal product must increase in K. This rules out such common production functions as Cobb-Douglas. See Dixit (1993) .
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(1) policy uncertainty where the uncertainty is in the form of Geometric Brownian Motion, we find that increasing uncertainty slows down investment despite the implicit subsidy arising from the variations in tax credit. However, when tax policy is modeled as a stationary jump process, we find that increasing uncertainty can have the opposite effect. One must therefore be careful before extrapolating the findings of much of the previous literature on uncertainty and investment to the case of tax policy uncertainty.
We turn in the next section to our model of investment and uncertainty. In Section III we present simulations of microlevel investment behavior. We move to simulations of aggregate investment in Section IV. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. Investment with Tax Policy Jumps
We begin with a simple model in which firms choose an optimal rule for when to undertake a project. The amount of capital employed in the project (K) and the time at which the project is initiated are at the discretion of the investor. The capital can be used to produce F(K) units of output per unit of time forever which can be sold at price p at time t. The production t function has the standard properties (FN > 0, FO < 0) . The price p is an after tax return and is 5 t modeled as stochastic. We assume it follows Geometric Brownian Motion:
where dz is an increment to a Wiener process. The return follows a continuous time random
Multiple values for the ITC are certainly possible. Gravelle (1994) describes the history 6 of the U.S. investment tax credit (Appendix A) and details credit rates for numerous equipment classes at a variety of rates (Table B. 3). We choose two parameter values for simplicity to focus on the stationary and bounded nature of the process.
It could be argued that other components of the tax code (tax rates, depreciation 7 schedules, minimum tax) give rise to a continuous, bounded process rather than either the jump process we model or Geometric Brownian Motion. In particular, mean reversion is a plausible candidate. For an analysis of investment in a world with mean reverting prices, see our paper, Metcalf and Hassett (1995 and Pindyck (1994) ).
Given the randomness in output price and capital costs, the firm wishes to determine the optimal rule for investment to maximize the expected discounted value of the stream of profits informative about changes in time to investment. Increasing volatility will increase the trigger price which in turn should discourage investment. On the other hand, the increased volatility raises the probability of hitting a favorably high price at which point the firm would like to invest.
Whether time to investment increases or decreases is an empirical matter.
Finally, we note that we focus on increasing uncertainty in the form of mean preserving there is no uncertainty in tax policy. The ITC always equals 10 percent. In the second case, it randomly switches between 5 percent and 15 percent while in the third case it switches on and off with its value equaling 20 percent when in effect .
9 dp t ' F p p t dz p and dp k t ' F k p k t dz k clearly no uncertainty over future tax policy; whatever policy is in effect now will be in effect forever. Now suppose that 8 is a very large number; the instantaneous probability of switching between the tax and no-tax states is very close to 1. In that case, the credit will switch on and off every instant. The variation will be extraordinarily high, but there will be almost no uncertainty. At each point in time, you know with great confidence what the credit will be at the next point in time. While there is no uncertainty at boundary values for 8, there is clearly uncertainty at intermediate values of 8. We do not focus on uncertainty of that type in this paper.
(4) III. Investment Simulations
In this section we present Monte Carlo simulations based on the model described in the last section to calculate the average price at which investment occurs. We begin by fixing 8 at zero and slightly modifying the model to allow randomness in the capital cost. The first change means that the only uncertainty in the model is due to price uncertainty in the form of Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). Second, by allowing GBM in capital costs, we can explicitly focus on capital price uncertainty. It can easily be shown that when output price and capital price both follow GBM, only the ratio of output to capital costs matters for investment purposes.
Moreover, when p and p both follow GBM then so does p/p . Thus all of the theoretical k k derivations in the last section apply directly. We model p and p by the following trendless k uncorrelated processes:
The ratio p/p follows GBM with trend F and variance F + F . In addition, one can easily
See Hassett and Metcalf (1994) for details as well as a complete derivation of the 10 model with output and capital prices following GBM.
If the only uncertainty is in the GBM process, then the mean time to investment can be 11 derived explicitly. See footnote 13 below.
We start the simulations at time 0 with output price equal to 1.40 and capital cost 12 equal to 18. Thus the ratio of prices at time zero equals 7.78 percent.
The expected time to investment equals when F -F > 0, where R is the
show that the required hurdle price ratio increases as the variance of the capital price increases .
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The increase in the hurdle price ratio leads one to expect that time to investment will rise.
However, with increasing variance in capital costs, it becomes increasingly likely that capital costs will fall sharply in a short period of time -raising the chances of the hurdle price ratio being hit in a shorter time. Thus whether time to investment goes up or down as the variance of capital costs increases is ambiguous . Therefore we turn to simulations to determine which of these effects 11 dominate. Simulations also allow us to assess the economic importance of changes in uncertainty. Table 1 illustrates the importance of mean preserving spreads on hurdle prices and investment times. We present results from a Monte Carlo experiment in which we simulate 1500 price paths and consider the investment behavior of a firm facing these prices. We assume a production function of the form F(K) = ln(1+K) and use a discount rate of .05 for investment.
Output prices are GBM with no trend and variance equal to .01. Capital costs also follow GBM with no trend and variance ranging from 0 to .025. The correlation between the output and capital price series is set to 0 .
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While simple, the model illustrates the essential points that we wish to make. First we note that the expected time to investment at the firm level is finite only if F > F . We focus k p 2 2 13 log of the hurdle price ratio and R is the log of the starting price ratio. We thank a referee for 0 pointing this formula out to us. Table 1 illustrates another important point. Note that the hurdle rate can rise either as a result of the output price rising or the capital cost falling. The last two columns indicate that the firm hits the hurdle rate primarily through a fall in capital cost rather than through a high realized output price. The fall in average capital cost conditional on investment is dramatic; as the variance rises from 0 to .015, cost falls by nearly 50%. When the variance rises to .025, the capital cost falls by 75 percent while the output price has only risen by 13 percent. While we have not linked the variation in capital price variability to tax policy, it is straightforward to do so. Let the pre-tax cost of capital be constant and equal and let the tax credit follow the process:
Assuming p = (1-B) , p is GBM with zero trend and volatility F (see equation (4)). Thus, in K K K Table 1 , mean preserving spread in the capital cost can be generated by mean preserving spreads in the tax credit.
The crucial result is that mean preserving spreads bring with them increased credit generosity as evidenced by the lower average realized price of capital conditional on investment.
The explanation for this result is quite simple. Firms simply wait for a good state (low capital cost) and concentrate their investment activity in those periods. For the GBM process, the value to waiting is quite high and the result is an increase in waiting time as the variance of the capital price increases.
This link between mean preserving spreads and credit generosity in this model will be present in any model that allows firms to adjust to changing conditions. Consider the following Mathematically, the increase in profits is a direct result of Jensen's Inequality and the 15 fact that the profit function is convex in price. increase by the area (A-B)/2. The increase in profits can be interpreted as a result of the fact that average price weighted by output goes up.
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The firm shifts production from a bad state (low output price) to a good state (high output price).
This is precisely analogous to the situation for the firm in Table 1 except that in the simple example above the firm is a seller whereas in Table 1 the firm is a buyer (of capital). In Table 1 , the good realization is a high tax credit (low capital cost). The analogous shift is in investment from the high price state to the low price state.
Continuing with the simple example in Figure 2 , consider a fluctuation in output price arising from a government policy that shifts randomly between a tax on output (lowering the price received by firm from P to P ) and a subsidy to output (raising the price received by the firm from 0 1 P to P ). While the tax/subsidy policy increases the variance of price received by the firm while 0 2 leaving the mean price unaffected ex ante, it also inevitably leads to a subsidy to the firm since the firm shifts production from the tax state to the subsidy state. Increasing the tax/subsidy policy would only increase the overall subsidy received by the firm. In effect, a close link between increases in uncertainty (in the form of a mean preserving spread) and generosity of the tax system is inevitable. This link will be even more apparent in the jump process to which we next turn.
The model of random tax policy with a jump process is the same as the one used in the Monte Carlo experiment for Table 1 except that capital costs are now fixed at 20 and there is a
Poisson Process for the tax credit. Again, we begin the output price process at 1.40.
Furthermore, we assume that B = B at time zero.
0 Table 2 presents results for a mean preserving spread in the tax credit. Panel A in Table 1 assumes that the jump process parameters ( There are both similarities between Panel A of Table 2 and Table 1 as well as differences. Table 1 that as the variance of the capital cost rises in the GBM example, the average cost of capital conditional on investing falls.
In both cases the increase in the spread costs the government revenue as investment piles up in the high credit period.
Next, note that the median time to investment in Panel A of Table 2 falls in contrast to Table 1 . This is explained both by the shift from a non-stationary to a stationary process as well as the discrete nature of the Poisson process. In a "good" state in the GBM world, there is an equal possibility of the price falling further (the state gets even better) and the price rising.
Because the change is small, there is little cost to waiting for a better realization in contrast to the Poisson process. In the latter case, the value of waiting in a good state is very low since d8 1 dp ' &.12 d8 0 dp ' .12
This would be true for any stationary process for a state in which price exceeds the 16 mean. Note that the value of waiting when in the high credit state is not zero. Firms wish to combine a high credit state with a high output price. As can be seen in the last column of Table 2 , firms on average sit through at least one high credit state before investing.
The optimality of speeding up investment can also be seen by considering the hurdle 17 rate for the high credit state (the state in which investment is most likely to occur). As the spread between the low and high credit values increases from 0 to 0.20, the hurdle rate (equal to p* /((1-1 B )p )) falls from .098 to .091.
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The absolute value of the covariance between 8 and p is "Var(p) . Since 8 is a linear 18 function of p, the correlation is equal to either positive or negative one. We use " as a proxy for the relation between firm profitability and government tax policy with higher values of " indicating a higher responsiveness of tax policy to changes in the economic environment.
17 stationarity implies that the firm can only transit to a lower credit state from a high credit state.
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Moreover, the cost of not moving increases with the spread since if the firm doesn't invest, the credit may shift to a sharply lower level as the spread goes up, a cost made more dramatic by the discrete nature of the process. The result is a fall in the median time to investment as the spread between the low and high credit values increases. There is a strong "use it or lose it" force at 17 work in the Poisson process model due in main to stationarity. The discrete nature of the process only serves to magnify this force. If we were to add more tax credit states to the model, this "use it or lose it" force would be attenuated somewhat, being more important when the credit is in states near the edges of its range.
The next panel in Table 2 allows for a covariance between policy and firm profitability . is that we can regard the successive marginal increments to capital as distinct little projects, each contributing its marginal product independently of the others" (Dixit and Pindyck, p. 366) .
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investment. In the second investment region, the probability of being in the low ITC state only rises modestly from 0.50 to 0.57. Median time to investment increases by less than 1 year. At " equals 0.08, the probability of being in the low ITC state now rises to as much as two-thirds in the second region and the impact on median time to investment is significant. And as noted above, if " equals 0.12, the fraction of time spent in the low ITC state can be as much as 75 percent with a consequent lengthening of median time to investment.
Summing up, we find that unlike the model in which capital prices move according to Geometric Brownian Motion, the ex post average hurdle price ratio and median time to investment both fall with increases in uncertainty in the Poisson Process model for constant 8s.
Increases in the relation between tax policy and firm profitability (") blunt this fall in time to investment and for sufficiently high values of ", the time to investment actually rises and then falls with mean preserving spreads.
While we have developed a model in terms of an individual firm's decision to make a onetime investment, it turns out that this is less of a restrictive modeling approach than might appear at first glance. Pindyck (1988) has developed a model of an individual firm making incremental investments. As he notes in an appendix to that paper, the model of incremental investment in that paper gives rise to a set of equations quite similar to the equations resulting from a model of one-shot investment (like ours) in which size and timing of investment are chosen. Moreover, as Dixit and Pindyck (1994) point out, one can view incremental investment as a sequence of distinct projects and build up an capital investment solution from the model developed above . The
As noted in the last section, this is a convenient way to model aggregate investment 20 building on the firm level investment decision developed in the previous section. Modeling either a single firm with variable (but irreversible) capital stock (as in Pindyck (1988)) or a continuum of single project firms in an industry setting (as in Caballero and Pindyck (1996) ) will not lead to qualitatively different conclusions.
This is consistent with both prices being GBM with no trend. Recall that in that case 21 (and if the processes are uncorrelated, the trend in p/p equals F . Moreover, Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) demonstrate how such a model can be used to describe microlevel behavior and then aggregated up to develop aggregate predictions. Thus one should not view the model as unnecessarily restrictive or removed from the capital accumulation problem that is of interest to macro and public finance economists. In the next section, we move from the individual to the aggregate level.
IV. Aggregate Analysis
The previous section focuses on behavior at the individual level. What happens in the aggregate as policy uncertainty changes? We modify the production function in equation (3) We begin by fixing the investment tax credit at 10 percent and considering how changes in the volatility of the price process affect cumulative investment. We vary F from 0.005 to 0.015.
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Results are presented in Table 3 . The first column presents results when the variance is .005 (this corresponds to an instantaneous volatility on the order of 7 percent of price). The initial level of investment based on the price starting at 8.75 percent of capital costs is .435. By the end of the first year, the median investment more than doubles to .958 and by year 10 equals 1.245.
Increasing the volatility of the price process decreases aggregate investment at any point in time.
Increasing F from .005 to .015 decreases the initial investment from .435 to .008. The rate of 2 growth of the capital stock increases but the level at year 10 with F equal to .015 is roughly a 2 fifth of the level at the lower variance. These results are quite robust to parameter choices: if prices follow GBM, aggregate capital stocks are lower as the price uncertainty increases. The higher hurdle price ratio significantly dampens capital formation. Table 4 illustrates results from the model with discrete changes in the capital cost due to an investment tax credit. The first column simply repeats the results from the last table (column 2). The second column of Table 4 introduces policy uncertainty in the form of an investment tax credit that randomly switches between .05 and .15 with Poisson parameters equal to 0.35. With a value for the 8's equal to .35, the expected time in any ITC state is roughly 3 years. We start the process with the initial level of the ITC random with an equal probability of being in the low or high state . Comparing the first two columns, we see that the median investment is higher in any 23 rows report median stocks.
If we start the process with a tax credit of zero, investment begins more slowly but 24 once again catches up within 5 years relative to the constant tax credit case.
of the years which we analyze. At the end of year 10, the capital stock is 45 percent higher with the policy uncertainty.
An important issue is the initial value of the ITC. The increase in investment from the ITC rising from 10 percent to 15 percent is substantially more than the decrease in investment from the ITC falling from 10 percent to 5 percent. We investigate the importance of the starting values in the next column where we start the ITC at the lower value of 5 percent. Initially, there is no investment and the capital stock lags behind the capital stock when the ITC is fixed at 10 percent for the first several years. By year 5 however, capital accumulation has caught up and by year 10, the capital stock is 17 percent higher.
The last column of the table increases the spread between the high and low tax credits from 10 percentage points to 20 points. Comparing columns 2 and 4, the impact of the increase in uncertainty is to once again increase capital stocks, with the increase by year 10 on the order of 30 percent .
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The results in Table 4 indicate that policy uncertainty in the form of a fluctuating ITC may not reduce capital formation. The key factor explaining this is the difference in investment when the ITC increases relative to when it decreases. Investment piles up in the high ITC periods and more than offsets the lack of investment in low ITC periods. In effect, the policy uncertainty brings with it a subsidy to investment since firms can time investment to take advantage of the high credit states of nature. One objection to these results is that it is unlikely that the probability
of regime shifts would be unaffected by firm profitability. We address this issue in the next table.
In Table 5 , we now let the 8's vary linearly with output price. Recall that and . We range " = " / " from 0 to 0.12. At every point in time, we find that 0 1 increasing the covariance between the Poisson change parameters and output price reduces aggregate investment. There are two forces at work, both of which act to reduce investment.
First, as " increases, region II (the region in which investment only occurs if the high tax credit is in effect) shifts to the right. The lower boundary moves from 1.61 to 1.98 as " increases from 0 to 0.12. Similarly, the upper boundary moves from 3.14 to 3.50. This shift will delay investment as it will increase the expected time required for output price to move to this region. Second, investment only occurs in this region if the high tax credit is in effect. As " increases, the unconditional probability of being in a high ITC state falls and can be as low as 1/3. Both these factors serve to retard investment and offset the increase in capital accumulation that results from the increase in the spread between the low and high credits. Comparing the last column of Table   5 with the first column of Table 4 , we see that these two effects effectively cancel each other out so that capital accumulation patterns are roughly the same in a world with a constant 10 percent tax credit and a world with either a zero or 20 percent credit but in which 8 is affected by output price with " equal to 0.12.
V. Conclusion
When tax policy uncertainty leads to capital costs following a continuous time random walk in logs, increasing uncertainty delays firm-level investment and leads to lower levels of investment. This result follows directly from work by Pindyck (1988) and others. However, when tax policy follows a stationary and discrete jump process that is more similar to actual historical experience, we find that increasing uncertainty can have the opposite effect, speeding up the time to investment, and increasing the amount of capital purchased conditional on investing.
At the aggregate level, the result is a higher capital stock both initially and after a number of years. The increase in investment is blunted to the extent that tax policy is related to firm profitability (" and " ). Estimating these parameters is an important topic that is left for future 0 1 research.
The difference in results between the two models follows from the bounded and discrete nature of the jump process model. In the "good" credit state, the value of waiting to invest is low and the loss from a shift from a "good" credit to a "bad" credit can be substantial. In contrast, the value of waiting to invest in the GBM model does not fall as sharply as capital costs fall. The non-stationarity of the process implies that investors are not subject to a "use it or lose it" effect to the extent found in the stationary process model. The first conclusion we draw from this research is that the impact of uncertainty on investment depends to a large extent on the underlying stochastic process. We believe that the process used in much of the literature to model uncertainty and investment is inappropriate for thinking about tax policy uncertainty.
Our second main conclusion is that there is an inextricable link between uncertainty and tax revenue. While the models differ in their implications for investment, they both share the common feature that increases in uncertainty bring with them an increased loss of tax revenues to the government. Hence, to the degree that governments are unable to commit to a fixed tax policy for investment, the uncertainty acts as an implicit subsidy to investment. The implicit subsidy may or may not lead to increased investment. When uncertainty follows a GBM process, for example, the subsidy is not large enough to offset the value of waiting as the variance increases and so investment is delayed.
Our conclusions are subject to a number of cautionary remarks. First, we note that the pre-tax price of capital is constant in our model. This follows if the supply of capital goods is perfectly elastic and there are no adjustment or other costs incurred when investment purchases swing wildly from booms to busts. For many countries, the implicit "smallness" assumptions built into our model may be reasonable. Second, the results in this paper should be interpreted as positive rather than normative. The model and results are an important first step towards understanding the effect of randomness in tax policy on aggregate investment. Further work remains however before conclusions can be drawn as to the welfare implications of tax policy uncertainty.
This also follows from the Bellman equation. 
Substituting these expressions into (A1) and (A2), dividing through by dt and letting dt go to zero yields a system of partial differential equations in p:
The expectation on the right hand sides of equations (A3) and (A4) are composed of two parts.
The first is the expected gain in V as prices evolve. The second part reflects the capital gain
Details are available upon request from the authors. This solution is valid so long as r 26 1
does not differ from r by an integer (or zero). In all cases that we consider this condition is met.
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The power series can be shown to converge for all positive prices so long as F is positive. 
(loss) if the tax credit is increased (reduced) which occurs with probability 8 (8 ).
1t 0t
To solve these equations, let Z = V -V and X = 8 V + 8 V . Making this change of 1 0 1 0 1t 0t variables yields the two independent differential equations in Z and X:
A solution for Z is given by the power series:
where for j=1, 2 and ( and ( are roots to the In region 2, the firm only invests if the high level of the tax credit is in place. The arbitrage argument used above is modified slightly to account for the investment in the presence of the high tax credit:
where p is the output price at time of investment, p is the price of the capital good, K is the
n ' 3,4,5,... 
where . As in region I, it can easily be shown that these series converge for all positive prices assuming F is positive. Value matching and smooth pasting arguments can be invoked to complete the system.
Value matching implies that the value function V and V must be equal at the boundaries of the 0 1 regions. These imply equations
In addition to the value matching conditions, smooth pasting conditions must be met.
Equations (A18) have zero trend and are uncorrelated. The instantaneous variance of the output price equals 0.01. The discount rate equals 0.05. The second column presents the optimal ratio of output to capital prices for investment (the hurdle ratio). The next column gives the median time to investment while the final two columns give average prices conditional on investment. There are 1500 replications for each simulation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. This table presents hurdle prices and average prices for output and capital cost (net of tax credit) at which investment takes place. In addition, it reports the expected number of changes in the ITC before investment occurs and the median time to investment. The probability of switching an ITC from a low (high) value to a high (low) value is fixed at .35. The index zero (one) indicates the low (high) ITC state. There are 1500 replications for each simulation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Results from authors' simulations based on 1,500 replications. Production function is F(K) = *ln(1+K) where * ~ N(1, 0.25). B equals 0.10. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Results from authors' simulations based on 1,500 replications. Production function is F(K) = *ln(1+K) where * ~ N(1, 0.25). Mean capital stock is reported at time t=0. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. " = " / " while B = 0.00 and B = 0.20. 
